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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LEROY SCHULTZ, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
JOSE QUINTANA, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 15134 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff sues for recovery of damages for personal 
injuries caused by defendant's negligence sustained while 
traveling on a right-of-way. 
DISPOSITION IN T~E LOWER COURT 
After trial on the merits an eight-person jury in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, with the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. 
presiding, found in favor of the plaintiff. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks affirmation of the Lower 
Court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Jose Quintana, was defendant in a personal 
injury suit tried in the Third Judicial District Court on March 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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16 and 17, 1977. Plaintiff, Leroy Schultz, alleged that 
appellant was negligent in the erroneous placement of c:ertai:. 
survey stakes on defendant's property, over one of which 
plaintiff claimed that he tripped, sustaining injuries whi~ 
allegedly disabled him for 88 days. Plaintiff sought to reco·. 
special damages for medical treatment and lost wages as a rai: 
switchman in the amount of $6,739.19. Plaintiff also claimed 
general damages for pain and suffering in the amount of 
$40,000.00. 
The survey stake, over which plaintiff claimed that 
he stumbled, was allegedly driven on or near a right-of-way 
adjoining the property line of defendant's property at 
2422 Lake Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Appellant had receivs 
notice of his successful bid on the property August 21, 1974. 
Plaintiff had a rightful easement in a coarsely graveled 
north-south right-of-way abutting defendant's property, by 
which right-of-way he gained access to parking and a garage 
at the rear of his property at 2420 Lake Street. Appell~t 
responded in an interrogatory that he drove the survey stakes 
or about August 24, 1974, in such a line as to identify a~ 
preserve his neighbor's right-of-way which he believed to be 
between the west boundaries of the Lake Street lots and t~ 
east boundary of the property he acquired from the state. f 
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stakes were allegedly installed in an erroneous attempt to 
delineate the property line on which a fence was to be built 
later between defendant's property and plaintiff's right-of-
way on the correct alignment as determined by a subsequent 
professional survey. 
On the night of the alleged injury, plaintiff had 
backed his car south over the gravel driveway turning west onto 
a second east-west paved public right-of-way that would lead 
him to Lake Street and thence to work. Plaintiff stopped 
his car on the paved right-of-way and in the dark rushed 
to his residence to get his railroad lantern. The plaintiff 
stumbled and fell over a corner survey stake sustaining injuries 
to his shoulder, back, ankle and teeth. Plaintiff brought 
this action to recover damages' sustained in that fall. rhe jury 
on special verdict found the defendant-appellant 75 percent 
negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiff in the amount of 
$3,342.26 plus costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
LANDOWNERS OWE A DUTY OF REASONABLE CARE 
TO USERS OF ADJACENT RIGHTS-OF-WAY. 
Plaintiff's status at the time of the incident was 
that of a traveler or user of a highway. As such the instruction 
to the jury given by the Lower Court was correct. The Court 
said: 
"The right of a person to use and enjoy ~is 
property is qualified by a duty to exercise 
reasonable care for the safety of others who 
may pass by his property. 
-3-
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The duty of an owner of property adjacent 
to a right-of-way extends not only to the 
user of the right-of-way but also to those who 
reasonably stray a short distance from the 
right-of-way for a casual purpose. 
The owner of land abutting the right-of-
way may be negligent creating an unsafe 
condition thereon. 
An unsafe condition as that term is used in 
these instructions, means a condition on 
the land in question involving an unreasonable 
risk of injury to person properly using such 
area." 
The complained of stake was on or near the boundary 
of defendant's property. It is therefore clear that plaintif' 
was also on or near the right-of-way at the time of the 
accident. Plaintiff's testimony shows that plaintiff never 
left his lawful right-of-way and that in fact the defendant h: 
erroneously placed the survey stakes not on the boundary line,, 
in the plaintiff's rightful right-of-way. The authorities a: 
clear as to both the status and duty owed plaintiff. 
In the case of Marsh v. City of Sacramento, 127 c.: 
2d 721, 274,P.2d 434, 438 (1954), the California Supreme Cour: 
approvingly quoted language from Prosser, Law of Torts, page 
352-3. It said: 
. "The privilege of a possessor of land to make 
use of his property is qualified by a due regard 
for the interests of others who may be affected 
by it. He is under the obligation to make only 
a reasonable use of his property, which causes no 
unreasonable harm to those in the vicinity. 
A large number of cases have involved . 
danger to the adjacent highway. The public 
-4-
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right of passage carries with it an obligation 
upon the occupiers of abutting land to use 
reasonable care to see that the passage is 
safe. They are not required to maintain or 
repair the highway itself, but they will 
be liable for any unreasonable risk to those 
who are on it ••• The obligation extends also 
to any conditions, such as an excavation next 
to the street, which are dangerous to those who 
use it. The status of a user of the highway 
has been extended to those who stray a few feet 
from it inadvertently or in an emergency, or 
even intentionally for some casual purpose." 
The same proposition is also supported by many other 
jurisdictions, see, e.g. Misterek v. Washington Mineral 
Products, Inc., 85 Wash. 2d 166, 531 P.2d 805, 807 (1974); 
Gaylord Container Corp. v. Miley, 230 F.2d 177, 182 (5th 
Cir. 1956); De Ark v. Nashville Stone Setting Corp., 38 Tenn. 
App. 678, 279 s.w. 2d 518, 521 (1955), and the Restatement 
of Torts, 2d, Explanatory Notes Section 368, comment e. 
As such the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on the duty which the defendant-landowner owed to plaintiff. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED DEFENDANT 1 S_ -
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT. 
In Morby v. Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 P.2d 231, 232 
(1953) this Court outlined the basis for granting a directed 
verdict by saying that such a verdict would only be granted when 
reasonable minds could draw only one conclusion on the basis 
of the facts. This situation is clearly not present in the 
instant case. 
-s-
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POINT III 
THE INADVERTENT MENTIONING OF INSURANCE BY 
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL DID NOT PREJUDICE THE 
JURY SO AS TO REQUIRE A NEW TRIAL. 
In Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d: 
(1965), this Court said the following: 
"In applying the law to the everyday affairs 
of life it is the duty of the courts to be 
as practical and realistic as possible and 
to keep abreast of changing times. For 
that reason ••• they are not nearly so apprehensiw 
that mention of this subject in the presence 
of the jury will be prejudicial as they formerly 
were. We do not depart from our former 
position: that the question of insurance is 
immaterial and should not be injected into the 
trial; and that it is the duty of both counsel 
and Court to guard against it. However, the mere 
mention of the subject does not necessarily 
in all instances compel the conclusion that 
it so prejudices the jury that a fair trial 
cannot be carried out." 
This Court further clarified this point in the case of OWens 
Trucking v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 509 P.2d 821, 823. Tu 
that case insurance was mentioned twice, once by the plaintif' 
attorney after the Court had instructed a witness to refrain 1 
mentioning insurance. Nonetheless, this Court upheld the ru;.i 
of the trial Court that an instruction to the jury to disrega 
the statements was sufficient to correct any alleged prejudic 
Certainly in the present case, ,where the court a~r 
counsel and instructed the jury to disregard the statement, 
this Court should again rule that insufficient prejudice w~ 
present to preclude a fair trial. 
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POINT IV 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO POINT III, DEFENDANT'S 
COUNSEL WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO ASK FOR A NEW 
TRIAL BY FAILING TO OBJECT IN A TIMELY 
MANNER. 
It is a well established rule that a timely objection 
is required to reserve a right to appeal, see, e.g. State v. 
Thompson, 58 Utah 291; 149 P.2d 161, i64; Annot., 45 A.L.R. 2d 318. 
Defendant's counsel clearly decided that the statements of 
plaintiff's counsel did not prejudice the jury and consciously 
decided to proceed with the trial rather than object. 
Appellant now requests the application of Rule 60(b), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and thereby seeks to obtain 
relief from the Lower Court's judgment on the basis that 
his former counsel committed excusable neglect. The thrust of 
Rule 60(b) is to relieve persons from the omissions of 
their counsel which eliminates their right to a day in court. 
Defendant-Appellant had his day in court and followed the 
decision of his counsel to proceed with the trial. The conscious 
and reasoned decision of one's attorney, in an area calling 
for such a decision, is clearly not a case for the application of 
Rule 60(b). 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant-appellant owed a duty to the 
plaintiff-respondent as a user of a right-of-way and the 
verdict of the jury in the lower court should be affirmed, 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN M. HARMSEN 
350 South 400 East, #G-1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoi~ I 
Brief of Respondent were served on Phil L. Hansen, PHIL L. ! 
HANSEN AND ASSOCIATES, attorneys for the defendant-appellant,! 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, I 
this /,--day of September, 1977. ~ 
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